Carraro, C., &Siniscalco, D. (1998). International institutions and environmental policy: International environmental agreements: incentives and political economy. European Economic Review, 42 (3-5), 561-572 Silva, E.C D. (2017). Self-coercion agreements with unequal national contributions. International Taxes and Public Finance, 24(4), 705-729. How many multilateral environmental agreements have been signed? Data or graph of agreements by year and type (contract, protocol, amendment). Limão, N. (2005).
Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do related agreements impose more cooperative outcomes? Journal of International Economics, 67(1), 175-199. This paper presents a new approach to implementing a relaxed analysis using a repeated game in order to reach an international environmental agreement (IEA) with the full participation of countries, where there is an asymmetric relationship in terms of emissions benefits and environmental damage. Our model shows that a stable EIA depends on the size of the benefit-cost ratio of the two types of countries, not their composition. In other words, the number of countries punishing for a balance that is poorly secured at renegotiation depends on the benefits and costs of both types of countries. Our results show that it is possible to achieve comprehensive cooperation on reduction between the two types of countries, avoiding a flexible selection of punishing countries on the basis of benefits and costs. Finus, M., Altamirano-Cabrera, J.-C., Van Ierland, E.C. (2005).